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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law: The Inherent Power of the Courts to Appropri-
ate Money for "Reasonably Necessary" Expenditures-"In the
absence of prohibitive legislation, courts have the inherent power
to provide themselves with appropriate procedures required for the
performance of their tasks."' The case of Commonwealth ex rel.
Carroll v. Tate2 is an example of a court's use of its inherent power.
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County had submit-
ted requests for funds to the Philadelphia City Council. These
requests were reduced from $19 million to $16 million by the
executive branch of the local government and subsequently passed
by the legislative branch. The court instituted a suit by a complaint
in mandamus to compel the executive and legislative branches to
appropriate the additional funds requested.
Two fundamental questions were involved in the suit: (1) does
the judicial branch of government have the inherent power to deter-
mine what funds are reasonably necessary for its efficient and
effective operation, and (2) if it has this power, does it have the
power to compel the executive and legislative branches to provide
the necessary funds? The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania an-
swered both of these questions in the affirmative.
It should be recognized immediately that this inherent power
is not an unlimited power. The very concept of inherent power in
the courts carries with it the implication that its use is for occasions
not provided for by established methods. In essence, courts use
their inherent power when the powers which they wish to exercise
are not specifically granted to them in the appropriate constitu-
tions but are related to the function which the courts must carry
out.
The inherent power of the courts is undoubtedly one of almost
unlimited application since the courts themselves are the ones to
say what that power is, but the use of inherent power has been
and should be exercised with utmost caution. This is particularly
true if the use of inherent power will conflict with the legislative
power to appropriate.'
This applies aptly to the case at hand, for here is a situation where
the court's inherent power does conflict with the legislative power
1. Exparte United States, 101 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 308 U.S. 519 (1939).
2. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971).




In Tate, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the
branches of government were co-equal; however, it stated that the
line of demarcation "between the Executive, the Legislative, and
the Judicial, and their respective jurisdiction and powers has never
been definitely and specifically defined." 5 The court went on to add
that the "co-equal independent Judiciary must possess rights and
powers co-equal with its functions and duties, including the right
and power to protect itself against any impairment thereof."'
In Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick,7 the
Indiana Supreme Court also indicated that a court's inherent
power should be used to guard against any impairment.
Courts are an integral part of the government, and entirely inde-
pendent; deriving their powers directly from the Constitution in
so far as such powers are not inherent in the very nature of the
judiciary. A court of general jurisdiction, whether named in the
Constitution or established in pursuance of the provisions of the
Constitution cannot be directed, controlled, or impeded in its
functions by any of the other departments of the government.
The security of human rights and the safety of free institutions
require the absolute integrity and freedom of action of courts.,
Because of the system of checks and balances established by the
democratic sysfem and also the independent feature of each branch
of government, no one branch should be able to control or influ-
ence another branch of government. This influence could take the
form of cuts in requested funds for any one branch, especially since
fiscal policies are controlled by the legislature.
Our sense of justice tells us that a court is not free if it is under
financial pressure, whether it be from a city council or other
legislative body, in the consideration of the rights of some indi-
vidual who is affected by some alleged autocratic or unauthor-
ized official action of such a body. One who controls the purse
strings can control how tightly those purse strings are drawn, and
the very existence of a dependent. Justice, as well as the security
of human rights and the safety of free institutions require free-
5. 442 Pa. at 51, 274 A2d at 197.
6. Id. at 52, 274 A.2d at 197.
7. 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940).




dom of action of courts in hearing cases of those aggrieved by
official actions, to their injury
In order for a court to compel appropriation of the needed
funds, the lower court has the burden of proving that its requests
are reasonably necessary. To be reasonably necessary not only
must the need be practical rather than relative, but it must be
shown that the funds are needed for the efficient and effective
administration of justice. In Tate, the judges documented their
requests by showing a specific breakdown of each and every re-
quest to be considered. These requests were then weighed against
the factors that the court felt were important in considering what
are reasonably necessary expenditures. The court took into consid-
eration such -things as sufficient funds for adequate staffing of the
courts, reasonable salaries for judicial personnel, necessary court
administration services and funds for the maintenance or construc-
tion of essential court facilities. Viewed in this light, the inherent
power of the court to require appropriation of funds clearly is not
an unlimited power.
The court must prove that these funds are reasonably necessary
for the efficient and effective operation of the court. Considering
that funds for most projects are limited, this test of "reasonable
and necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the court"
seems realistic; however, what does the court view as reasonably
necessary expenditures? The addition of more judges or courts in
jurisdictions facing severe backlogs might be considered reasona-
bly necessary, but some expenditures in the past have bordered on
the ridiculous. As noted in In re Surcharge of County
Commissioners,10 the court's inherent power has been used and
expense incurred; (a) to feed and lodge jurors; (b) for attendance
of physicians upon persons who have become ill while impaneled;
(c) for the transfer of jurors; (d) for appointment of custodians of
ballot boxes; and (e) for the appointment of bodyguards. Most of
the recent cases deal with the hiring and compensating of court
personnel."
It is also relevant that the judiciary is not the only arm of
9. Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 633-34, 220 N.E.2d 532, 534 (1966).
10. 12 Pa. D. & C. 471 (1929).
11. See Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 651, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966); Judges
for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969);
State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis Couiiy, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970).
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government that needs more funds. Available funds must be appor-
tioned on the basis of need-the main reason why the court must
prove that its requests are reasonably necessary for the court's
efficient and effective operation. When speaking of funds, one
should examine the comparisons between the amount of funds
allocated td the judiciary as opposed to the other branches and
agencies of government, both federal and state. In 1947, costs for
the judiciary were 1/19 of 1% of the total federal budget. Current
figures (1965-66) show that the judiciary's budget is just 1/17 of
1% of the total federal budget. Twenty years shows little change.
Costs of the federal judiciary in 1963 were $66 million. Contrast
this with the $50.9 billion spent by the Department of Defense in
the same year. Percentages for states and counties, on the whole,
average better than those of the federal government. In 1964, states
allocated 6/10 of 1% while counties allocated approximately 6.3%
of their total budgets for judicial functions."2
Assuming the court does have the inherent power to determine
that funds are reasonably necessary for the efficient and effective
operation of the court, should it then be able to compel payment
of these funds? This question brings into focus numerous other
questions which should be considered. What is "reasonably neces-
sary" in view of the scarcity of public funds and ever increasing
expenses? In conjunction with this question, it must be remem-
bered that a higher court decides if the lower court's requests are
reasonably necessary. If the requests are adjudged to be reason-
ably necessary but there are no available funds, there is an addi-
tional problem. Can the court force the legislature or executive
branches of government to raise more money, or should the court
be able to raise money by levying taxes or fees?
A problem related to the question which arose in the present
case would occur if the executive branch of government submitted
a request for funds which the legislature denied. Again, it would
be up to the judiciary to decide if these requests were reasonably
necessary. In such a case would the judiciary be inclined to find
favorably for the executive branch? Justice Hale of the Washington
Supreme Court stated that "the Judiciary should recognize that
other branches of government . . . are ultimate guardians of the
liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the
courts."' 13 He went on to add:
12. 50 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 296 (1967).
13. "-iendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, _ , 456 P.2d 696, 704 (1969).
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Courts must thus operate under a degree of restraint which, while
assuring to each person every natural right and every right
vouchsafed him by the constitutions, does not enlarge upon those
rights.in such a way as to disparage the constitutional powers of
the legislative and executive branches or abridge their constitu-
tional capabilities."4
So although some states may agree that the court does have the
inherent power to appropriate funds, not all of these states are in
complete agreement as to the use of such power.' 5
A solution for the problem of lack of funds seems to be supplied
in Pennsylvania by the Judiciary Article of 1968. In essence, it
provides that the financial responsibility for the operation of the
courts should be taken over by the state rather than by counties
and municipalities.'" This would take some of the financial burden
off the counties and cities.
Another possible solution is that suggested in Judges for the
Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne.17 There the court stated
that the "inherent power of courts is not exhausted when needs of
administration of justice have been declared and urged on legisla-
tive councils," since, in a limited area, "courts have the inherent
power to bind the State or the county contractually" with respect
to payment of judicial expenses.18 This, in effect, could mean that
even if funds were not allocated to the judiciary it could still receive
necessary services and supplies merely by entering into contracts
with others. Then, when the funds ran out, the state would be
forced to pay based on a contractual obligation. There probably
would be the test of reasonableness and necessity placed on the
formulation of the contracts however.
Although Wisconsin's court system is financed by litigants,
municipalities, counties, and the state, 9 similar problems concern-
ing reasonably necessary expenditures can be found.
Early in the history of.this state, it was established that courts
14. Id.
15. See cases cited note 10 supra. See also Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738
(1963).
16. Weis, A New Name and a New Financial Policy for the Courts, 41 PENN. B.A.Q.
189, 191 (1970). Supposedly this move would result in an increase in efficiency and in the
further independence of the judiciary.
17. 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969).
18. Id. at - 172 N.W.2d at 440.
19. Hallows- & DeWitt, The Need for Court Organization, 1954 Wis. L. REV. 376.
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of record had an inherent power to appoint such assistants as they
deemed necessary to expedite and properly conduct judicial busi-
ness.20 A court's power to determine its requirements for function-
ing efficiently and performing its duties was again considered in In
re Court Room,2' in which a circuit court had held that Milwaukee
County had to provide it with suitable quarters. The supreme court
agreed, holding that in order to preserve the full and free exercise
of the judicial functions of the court, the circuit court could de-
mand reasonable quarters. Finally, in the case of State ex rel.
Reynolds v. County Court,22 wherein a Kenosha county judge had
an air conditioner installed because the heat in the courtroom
made it difficult to conduct hearings, the supreme court held that
this was a matter of necessity. Although the question wasn't raised
in the vase, the supreme court held that the court had the power
to determine the necessity for air conditioning.
-In view of these cases, it would appear that Wisconsin sub-
scribes to the position that if an expenditure is reasonably neces-
sary for the court's efficient and effective operation, funds may be
allocated for it by judicial order.
ROBERT W. MUREN
Municipal Corporations: Recovery From Municipality for Value of
Services Furnished Without Compliance with Statutory Bidding
Requirements-The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided in Blum v.
City of Hillsboro' that the plaintiff contractor had a cause of ac-
tion for unjust enrichment against the defendant municipality as a
result of services performed under an amended municipal contract
which, as amended, was rendered invalid for failure to comply with
the procedure required by the competitive bidding statute.2 The
20. In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
21. 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).
22. 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960).
1. 49 Wis. 2d 667, 183 N.W.2d 47 (1971).
2. WIs. STAT. § 62.15(1) (1969) provides:
All public construction, the estimated cost of which shall exceed $1,000 shall be let
by contract to the lowest responsible bidder; all other public construction shall be
let as the council may direct. The council may also by a vote of three-fourths of all
the members-elect provide by ordinance that any class of public construction or any
part thereof may be done directly by the city without submitting the same for bids.
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